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Abstract 
In this paper we build a simple Keynesian model on the role of liquidity preference in the determination 
of economic performance. We postulate, for the sake of the argument, a purely “horizontalist” 
environment, i.e., a world of endogenous money where the central bank is able to fix the interest rate at 
a level of its own willing. In the paper, we show that even in a purely "horizontalist" framework the 
Keynesian theory of liquidity preference, while obviously not constituting anymore a theory for the 
determination of the interest rate, continues to be a fundamental piece of theory for the determination 
of both the level and evolution over time of aggregate income and capital accumulation. We show how 
households’ liquidity preference (financial markets’ behaviour) and banks’ policy of profits’ distribution 
interact with each other to determine real macroeconomic outcomes. However powerful, the banking 
system and monetary authorities are not the deus ex-machina of our economies and financial markets are 
likely to exert a permanent influence on our economic destiny. We finally draw some policy implications 
in line with Minsky’s emphasis about the changing role of monetary authorities in ensuring financial 






Keywords: Liquidity preference, endogenous money, finance dominance. 
 
JEL Code: B26, B50, E12, E44 
 
Acknowledgments: We thank Marc Lavoie, Louis-Philippe Rochon, Ozlem Onaran and Maria 
Nikolaidi for valuable comments to previous versions of this paper, which significantly helped to 
improve our work.  
 
Corresponding authors: 
Marco Missaglia, Department of Political and Social Sciences, University of Pavia. Email: 
marco.missaglia@unipv.it. 
Alberto Botta, Department of Economics and International Business, Business School, University 
















Central Bank’s power versus the tyranny of financial markets: Liquidity preference and 
macroeconomic dynamics in a world of endogenous money 
 
Marco Missaglia, University of Pavia, Italy* 
Alberto Botta, University of Greenwich, United Kingdom**  
 
 
1. Introduction  
The theory of liquidity preference as incorporated in the traditional IS-LM scheme all of us grew up with 
was a theory for the determination of the interest rate and (then) the level of activity. This theory was 
developed in a framework of exogenous money. Money supply was taken as fixed, decided by monetary 
authorities, and fluctuations of money demand were in charge of determining the equilibrium interest 
rate and then the level of output. Money, however, is endogenous. The monetary authority does not 
decide the quantity of money, but the interest rate. This is now recognized even by the many (the large 
majority of the profession) who still adhere to the Wicksellian loanable funds theory and believe in the 
existence of a natural interest rate determined by the fundamentals of thrift and productivity. The central 
bank decides the policy rate and allows the supply of money to adjust to whatever is the level of demand.   
Does money endogeneity imply that private sector’ demand for money (liquidity preference) becomes 
a useless tool? Some strands of Keynesianism seem to share the same, positive answer. Take the so-called 
New Consensus, for instance. Carlin and Soskice (2015), who made a great effort to spread and clarify the 
new-Keynesian perspective by means of very elegant and accessible models, are rather explicit: 
  
“… structural changes in the economy that shift the private sector’s demand for money, do not alter 
the central bank’s ability to achieve its desired output gap… any shift in the money demand function 
affects the money supply [endogenous money] but does not feedback to influence real economic 
activity” (pp. 158-159). 
  
In a very useful representation of the New Consensus 3-equation model, Lavoie (2009) shows things are 
a bit more complicated. A rise in liquidity preference, there represented as a “Minsky moment” (a rush 
towards liquidity and riskless assets that prompts an increase in those market rates relevant to the private 
sector’s spending decisions), does have a temporary recessionary impact. However, if the central bank is 
able to revise downward its estimate of the natural interest rate and reduces the policy rate accordingly, 
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the economy will return at its NAIRU equilibrium and inflation on target. A variation in liquidity preference, 
despite its real short-term effects, does not modify the steady-state position of the economy1.  
Post-Keynesian authors do not have a unique position in this respect. On the one hand, the so-called 
“structuralist” (Palley, 1994, 2013, 2017; Dow, 1997), believe that banks’ behaviour is characterized by a 
traditional upward sloping loans’ supply curve - the interest rate goes up with credit expansion and 
constitutes an endogenous variable of the system. In this case, money is endogenous but the liquidity 
preference of the public may matter again2: 
  
“An increase in liquidity preference puts upward pressure on interest rates, which in turn puts 
downward pressure on output and employment, as long as the money supply is constrained to 
some degree” (Dow, 1997, p.64). 
 
On the other hand, the so-called “early horizontalists”3 (Moore, 1988), believe in the ability of the central 
bank to fix the interest rate at a level of its own willing and follow Kaldor (1985) in denying any significant 
role to liquidity preference: 
 
“… ‘liquidity preference’ was regarded as the essential factor that distinguished Keynesian from 
pre-Keynesian theories…. All this, however, depended on the assumption of the quantity of money 
being determined irrespective of all other factors that determined the demand for goods and 
services. If we regard money as an endogenous factor, liquidity preference and the assumption of 
interest-elasticity of the demand for money cease to be of any importance” (p.9; italics is ours). 
Quite an astonishing parabola: from being the cornerstone of the Keynesian edifice (“the essential factor 
that distinguished Keynesian from pre-Keynesian theories”), liquidity preference “ceases to be of any 
importance”4.  
Lavoie (1996) offers a more elaborated and nuanced analysis of the “horizontalist” approach. He shows 
that “horizontalism” might be potentially compatible with the idea of liquidity preference as a relevant 
factor in the determination of interest rates’ spreads among different financial assets. Lavoie (1996) 
himself, however, recognizes that a source of tension may still remain between horizontalists on the one 
hand and, on the other, those post-Keynesian authors believing in the importance of liquidity preference 
in the determination of the real equilibrium of the economy. This emerges from the actions possibly taken 
by monetary authorities when they are strongly determined in changing markets’ conventions 
underpinning an excessive and undesirable (from their point of view) spread between the base rate and 
 
1 Of course, the real effects of liquidity preference variations would be permanent in a model with growth hysteresis 
(due, for instance, to some kind of Kaldorian technical progress function). However, this would be true for any 
possible shock and not just for liquidity preference shifts.  
2 According to Palley (2017), there are also “later horizontalists” (for instance Lavoie, 2006). These authors fully 
acknowledge the role of liquidity preference in the determination of interest rates, but do not recognize that the 
overall financial system may be “financially constrained”.   
3 This terminology is due to Palley (2017).  
4 This horizontalist perspective is also incorporated in a post-Keynesian pedagogical model proposed by Fontana and 
Setterfield (2009), in an attempt at building a teachable post-Keynesian model to be contrasted with the 3-equation 
model of the new-Keynesians and the more traditional IS-LM scheme. 
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the interest rates on longer term assets. In his own words, “if monetary authorities are sufficiently 
insistent and consistent, a shift in interest rate differentials can only be temporary” (Lavoie, 1996, p. 295). 
On top of being important from a theoretical point of view, this debate has relevant political 
implications. At the end of the day, it is a debate around the relative roles of and distribution of power 
between central banks and financial markets. Horizontalists (and their modern followers of the Modern 
Monetary Theory) give prominence to the power of monetary authorities. Structuralists recognize a 
crucial macroeconomic role for financial markets, “money managers” and the alike. In a sense, the 
Keynesian theory of liquidity preference was a recognition of the power of the City, of how its changing 
mood and orientations could seriously affect the real economy and the concrete prospects of firms and 
households. This is for instance the interpretation offered by Bibow (2009), who considers liquidity 
preference as the fundamental piece of economic theory needed to understand the big mess in global 
finance that led to and accompanied the 2007-8 world crisis. Given these premises, it is not surprising that 
some recent papers – Oreiro et al. (2020), Mehrling (2020), Bertocco and Kalajzic (2014 and 2018), 
Dafermos (2012), Lavoie and Reissl (2018), Palley (2017) and Asensio (2017) among others – have revived 
the debate around the macroeconomic role of Keynesian liquidity preference in a world of endogenous 
money.  
As argued below, the alleged irrelevance of liquidity preference - or what we label here as the 
“Kaldorian view” - rests on three key and very unrealistic assumptions:  
(a) Capital gains/losses are assumed away;  
(b) Bonds and bank loans are treated as perfect substitutes from the perspective of non-financial firms;  
(c) Banks’ profits are fully distributed to households, which essentially means that banks operate without 
own funds.  
Taylor and O’Connell (1985), Taylor (2004), Lavoie (2014) and, though somehow differently, Dafermos 
(2012) and Asensio (2017) remove assumption (a) to give liquidity preference some traction in the 
determination of macro outcomes. The same result may be achieved by removing assumption (b). Some 
post-Keynesian literature related to the idea of “finance frontier” and based on Kalecki (1937) and 
Davidson (1972) takes the different modalities of financing capital accumulation as perfect complements5, 
and then the willingness of people to hold bonds (shares) rather than bank deposits becomes crucial again.  
In this paper, we contribute to the debate by analysing what happens if we remove assumption (c) 
instead. So far, the implications of assumption (c) have been neglected by the literature. In this paper, we 
demonstrate that assuming banks retain even a small share of their profits in order to accumulate own 
funds is more than enough to make liquidity preference of the public relevant for the determination of 
economic activity both in the short and in the medium run. More specifically, we obtain three main results.  
First, we show that liquidity preference matters just because it affects the relative importance of the 
different ways (either direct returns on bonds’ holding or banks’ dividends) through which capital incomes 
accrue to households. In a world of “financialized” capitalism, where households’ (mediated) participation 
to financial markets has increased considerably and an increasing part of their income (or pensions) may 
come from these types of financial relations, this is more than enough to make liquidity preference 
relevant for the real economy. 
 
5 As Davidson (1972, p.348) put it, “In an uncertain world, therefore, internal and external finance are complements 
rather than substitutes…”.  
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Second, differently from Dafermos (2012) and Asensio (2017), we show that liquidity preference 
influences the level of economic activity even when it does not play any role in the determination of 
interest rates or interest rate spreads. In this paper, we assume an economy where money is created 
endogenously in a purely “horizontalits environment” and with a fully accommodationist stance taken by 
the central bank. For the sake of our argument, we assume “the” interest rate (below we will briefly 
elaborate on interest rates’ multiplicity) to be fully exogenous. Yet, changes in liquidity preference remain 
fundamental for the determination of the real equilibrium of the economy. In a similar vein, differently 
from Taylor and O’Connell (1985), Taylor (2004), Taylor and Rada (2008), and Lavoie (2014), we also 
demonstrate that liquidity preference matters for the real economy even in the absence of capital gains 
and/or losses.  
Third, we extend the study of the role of liquidity preference beyond the short run and show that 
changes in liquidity preferences may have long-lasting consequences on capital accumulation and, hence, 
on the medium-run development of the economy6. In doing so, we provide a formal demonstration of 
some numerical simulations contained in Dafermos (2012), albeit through different economic 
mechanisms. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the structure of our model through the analysis 
of the balance sheets (stocks) and the Social Accounting Matrix of our economy. Section 3 illustrates the 
“Kaldorian view”. Sections 4 and 5 describe the short- and medium-run equilibria of the economy, and 
the way liquidity preference affect them. Section 6 concludes.            
 
 
2. Structure and accounting 
The recent debate on the macroeconomic role of liquidity preference does not consider exclusively the 
liquidity preference of the public (households’ liquidity preference), but also the liquidity preference of 
banks and other financial firms (Le Heron and Mouakil, 2008). This certainly helps and constitutes an 
element of realism in any applied macro model. The route we are going to follow here, however, is 
different. We will show, on the basis of the ideas expressed by Keynes in 1937 (Keynes, 1937), that the 
very simple structure of the traditional Keynesian cross is more than enough to understand the reasons 
why the liquidity preference of the general public continues to represent, even in a world of endogenous 
money, a key determinant of the steady state medium-run level of real output.  
We assume a very simple closed economy without government composed by households, non-
financial firms (or simply firms) and banks. The balance sheets of these social actors are summarized in 







6 In this paper we will not employ the expression “long run” in association with the steady state equilibrium of the 
system. The reason is that labor productivity (technology) and population (labor force) will be taken as fixed: the 
time horizon we are taking into consideration is not “long” enough to allow these magnitudes to vary. 
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Table 1 – The balance sheets of the economy 
 
 
For the sake of the argument, we assume that firms do not retain profits. Hence, their wealth, VF in Table 
1, is zero, and they must make recourse to external finance to fund capital accumulation (including 
retained profits would not change the logic of our argument, except in the completely unrealistic case 
where this is the only way of financing capital accumulation). Banks and households may provide this 
finance: 
  
“The transition from a lower to a higher scale of activity involves an increased demand for liquid 
resources which cannot be met without a rise in the rate of interest, unless the banks are ready to 
lend more cash or the rest of the public to release more cash at the existing rate of interest” 
(Keynes, 1937, p.222). 
 
The banking system creates money (M) by extending loans (L) – “loans make deposits”, according to the 
endogenous money adagio. Households (“the rest of the public”) cannot create money ex-nihilo and make 
loans to firms by subscribing bonds (“releasing more cash”), “B”, i.e. by changing the composition of their 
wealth (less money, more bonds). We will assume that bonds are “consols” or perpetuities. These are 
pieces of paper which are never redeemed and pay the owners, say, 1 dollar after one period has elapsed. 
The market price of these bonds is “pb” and by construction the interest rate on them is ib = 1/pb, with pb 
= 1 + 1/(1+ib) + 1/(1+ib)2 +… = 1/ib. The total interest bill paid on them coincides with the number of 
outstanding bonds, i.e., “B”. 
Banks’ own funds (OF) or own capital are an asset from the perspective of banks’ owners (some 
households) and a liability from the perspective of banks. In most cases, these own funds take the form 
of equities, but here this is not relevant since, for the sake of the argument, we want to abstract from 
capital gains. In other words, our argument holds regardless of whether banks are corporates or 
unincorporated firms. Observe, also, that banks wealth is zero. 
According to Table 2, the economy produces one commodity, GDP, used for both consumption and 









Table 2 – The Social Accounting Matrix of the economy 
 
 
We assume that banks do not pay interests on households’ deposits and a fraction λ (0 ≤ λ ≤ 1) of their 
profits is distributed to households. We do not explicitly model central bank. Rather, we consolidate the 
banking system (commercial banks plus central bank) and assume the central bank to take a fully 
accommodationist stance. Consistently, in Table 2 “iL” is the lending rate, i.e., the interest rate charged by 
banks on their loans to firms. Taking the central bank explicitly into consideration would have certainly 
made the structure richer and allow to incorporate interest rates’ multiplicity. In fact, in a more realistic 
setting, we should model the central bank in charge of fixing the policy rate to achieve its policy goals, 
whatever they might be. In such a case, the lending rate “iL” would be typically determined as a mark-up 
on this policy rate. Whilst it could be certainly argued that the size of the mark-up varies with the level of 
banks’ own funds (or capital cushion) and other factors7 (among which people liquidity preference), we 
will take it as given. This simplifying assumption is made for the sake of the argument. Our purpose, let us 
insist on this point, is indeed to show that even if the interest rate is taken as fully exogenous, liquidity 
preference remains a key element for the determination of the short- and medium-run equilibria of the 
economy. To keep our model as simple as possible, we do even more and take the policy rate and the 
lending rate as being one and the same (“the” interest rate), since with a constant mark-up this does not 
entail any loss of generality and does not change in any way the results of our analysis.  
 
7 Carlin and Soskice (2014, chapter 5) argue that the mark-up lowers with higher own funds: in this case, commercial 
banks are better equipped to deal with riskier loans, expand their credit supply and the lending rate falls. Mark-ups 
and lending rates might also be affected by people liquidity preference and/or central bank’s open market 
operations. As an example, assume people (money managers) and/or the central bank want to increase the share of 
government bonds in their portfolios. Ceteris paribus, this will lower the return on government bonds and induce 
commercial banks to hold less of them and expand their credit supply to the private economy. Once again, the 
lending rate (mark-up on the policy rate) would fall too.        
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In Table 2, following standard conventions, a dot over a variable indicates its time derivative (absolute 
variation per unit of time), whereas a “hat” stands for its growth rate.  
 
3. The Kaldorian view  
The idea that liquidity preference “ceases to be of any importance” can be easily illustrated within the 
simple structure illustrated by Tables 1 and 2 if we assume that conditions (a) – (c) identified above hold 
true. 
In this model economy, output (Y) is determined by aggregate demand, consumption plus investments: 
𝑌 = 𝐶 + 𝐼. Normalizing by the capital stock and defining u = Y/K (rate of capacity utilization), c = C/K 
(normalized consumption) and g = I/K (rate of capital accumulation), we get: 
   
𝑢 = 𝑐 + 𝑔                                                                                                                                              (1) 
 
As it is the case in several Keynesian models, aggregate consumption is postulated to be a positive function 
of households’ current income and accumulated wealth (this can be easily derived from a Modigliani 
(1986) aggregate consumption function). Given assumption (c), households’ income is here the same as 
GDP (there are no banks’ retained profits, i.e., λ = 1) and, using a linear form, we may write:  
𝐶 = 𝛼𝑌 + 𝛽𝑉!  
Normalizing again by the capital stock and using assumptions (a) and (b), which together imply Vh = K, this 
becomes:  
𝑐 = 𝛼𝑢 + 𝛽                                                                                                                                            (2) 
The good way to write an investment function is a controversial issue within the Keynesian tradition. In 
fairly general terms, aggregate investment spending is likely to respond positively to the (expected) profit 
rate. In the simple economy we are dealing with, the net macro profit rate accruing to non-financial firms 





where W is the wage bill paid by firms to households and interest payments have been accounted for in 
the calculation of net profits. Be W/K = ωN/K = ω(N/Y)(Y/K) = ωa(Y/K), with “N” indicating total 
employment, “ω” the wage rate (real and nominal, there is no difference here) and “a” the labour 
coefficient (the inverse of labour productivity). Assuming a = 1 (we are not interested in studying the 
dynamics of labour productivity), we have W/K = ω(Y/K), with ω representing at the same time the wage 
rate and the wage share in total GDP. Then, defining 𝑙 = 𝐿 𝐾⁄  (the share of capital accumulation financed 
through bank loans) and observing that accounting consistency implies L/K + (B/(ibK)) = 1, we may express 
the profit rate as  
𝑟 = (1 − 𝜔)𝑢 − [𝑖&𝑙 + 𝑖)(1 − 𝑙)]   
Using assumption (b), which implies ib = iL = i, the profit rate becomes:  
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𝑟 = (1 − 𝜔)𝑢 − 𝑖                                                                                                                                
There are different ways of mixing the components of the net macro profit rate – distribution (ω), demand 
(u) and finance (i) – to cook some kind of Keynesian investment function. Here, for the sake of the 
argument, we want to keep the investment function as simple as possible and only concentrate on the 
accelerator term (including the interest rate as a specific argument of the investment function would 
make the model more complicated without affecting the role of liquidity preference in this economy):     
𝑔 = 𝛾 + 𝛿𝑢                                                                                                                               (3) 
Equations (1), (2) and (3) constitute a complete model for the determination of the flow-equilibrium of 
the economy. This model (just a bit more than the Keynesian cross) fully determines the three endogenous 
variables u, c and g. 
 
Figure 1 – Short-run equilibrium in the Kaldorian view 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the solution. The AD curve expresses aggregate demand (c + g) as a function of capacity 
utilization, whereas the “Growth” curve represents equation (3). Provided that the standard Keynesian 
stability condition holds, i.e. (1 – α) > δ, the slope of the AD curve is greater than 1 and the equilibrium 
values u1, g1 and c1 are all positive (unless autonomous investment, γ, is strongly negative). It might be 
noticed that the position of the AD curve depends on all the parameters included in the consumption and 
investment functions but does not vary with the willingness of the public to “release more (or less) cash”, 
i.e., households’ liquidity preference. To understand the economic rationale of this point, assume the 
economy is in a steady state: period after period, each flow and each stock grows at the rate g1 we just 
solved for. This clearly implies that in such a steady state the shares of money and bonds in households’ 
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portfolios as well as the shares of firms’ investments funded by bonds and bank loans are constant. At a 
point, for whatever reason (a sunspot), liquidity preference goes up. People stop subscribing bonds at the 
same rhythm as before and banks – in order to prevent the interest rate from increasing8 – expand their 
supply of loans (and then money supply: loans make deposits). Banks are giving households the extra-
money they want to hold (money supply adjusts to money demand) and are giving firms the amount of 
funds households do not want to lend anymore. The share of firms’ investment funded by bank loans and 
the share of money in households’ portfolios increase, but the real equilibrium is totally unaffected. To go 
back to Keynes’ quotation, this is nothing but a model where in case “the public decides to release less 
cash”, “banks are ready to lend more”. A world where households get in the form of banks’ distributed 
profits what previously got as a remuneration on bonds’ holding. No more than that. The equilibrium 
represented in Figure 1 is both a short- and a medium-run equilibrium. 
This result of irrelevance of liquidity preference rests essentially on the three assumptions listed above. 
Removing either (a) or (b) would certainly be enough to return liquidity preference a key role in the 
determination of aggregate income in a world of endogenous money. On the one hand, taking capital 
gains into consideration would force us to recognize that households’ wealth and its evolution over time 
(and then aggregate consumption, aggregate demand and output) do not depend exclusively on 
households’ overall savings, but also on how these savings are allocated between money and bonds, since 
the latter is the only item on which capital gains (losses) may mature. This is the route already explored 
by a series of contributions (Taylor and O’Connell, 1985; Taylor, 2004; Taylor and Rada, 2008; Lavoie, 
2014). On the other hand, taking bank loans and corporate bonds as imperfect substitutes would lead us 
to recognize that the profit rate realized by non-financial firms (and then capital accumulation, provided 
that the investment function is made explicitly dependent on the profit rate) depends on the willingness 
of the public “to release more or less cash”.  
Our purpose, however, is to remove assumption (c): the interaction between banks’ profits distribution 
and banks’ capitalization is indeed an important channel through which liquidity preference affects macro 
outcomes.   
 
4. Banks’ profits and capital 
Banks retain a portion of their profits both because they have to and because they want to. International 
banking regulation imposes banks to retain a minimum level of own funds with respect to the value of 
their assets in order to be allowed to operate. This is the so-called required (or minimum) capital adequacy 
ratio, say Ω:, originally set at 8 percent of banks’ assets in Basel II agreement and now raised to 10.5 
percent under Basel III. In order to accomplish with these regulatory requirements and have enough 
margins of flexibility in the event of non-performing loans, banks generally pursue a target (or normal) 
capital adequacy ratio Ω∗ > Ω: (see Godley and Lavoie, 2007). This can be stated as a multiple of the 
minimum capital, i.e., Ω∗ = (1 + 𝜂)Ω:, around which the actual capital adequacy ratio Ω fluctuates. 
 
8 Do not forget our discussion in the last part of section 2. 
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According to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2018), for instance, actual own funds of US financial 
institutions fluctuated from 10 percent to about 13 percent of their assets from 1996 to 20189.     
So, assume banks only distribute a fraction 0 < λ < 1 of their profits, and the rest is devoted to the 
accumulation of own funds. In section 5, we will discuss the determinants of λ, but in the short-run version 
of the model it can be safely taken as given. Equations (1) and (3) remain the same as before, but the 
consumption function (2) is to be properly amended. As is clear from Table 2, in this case households’ 
income does not coincide with GDP (Y), since households are not receiving the totality of banks’ profits 
anymore. If we maintain that aggregate consumption is a function of households’ income and wealth, the 
relevant equation becomes:  
𝑐 = 𝛼[𝑢 − (1 − 𝜆)𝑖𝑙] + 𝛽                                                                                                      (4)                                                                                                                            
This is not the end of the story, however. Households’ wealth is Vh = B/i + (M + OF) and, dividing both sides 
by K (Vh = K), one gets  
𝑙 = 1 − '
%+"
                                                                                                                                             (5) 
where (𝐵 𝑖𝑉!⁄ ) is the fraction of households’ wealth held in the form of corporate bonds. Needless to say, 
this fraction is an expression of households’ liquidity preference. The stronger their liquidity preference, 
the lower that fraction. Abstracting from the so-called “transaction” demand for money (which here is 
not relevant at all) and following Taylor (2004) and Lavoie (2014), it is convenient to represent liquidity 
preference simply through a fixed parameter:   
!
"#!
= 𝜇 ≤ 1                                                                                                                              (6) 
This way, (4) may be written as  
𝑐 = 𝛼[𝑢 − 𝑖(1 − 𝜆)(1 − 𝜇)] + 𝛽                                                                                                     (7) 
which is the final formulation of our consumption function.  








                                                                                                              (9) 
 
The standard short-run stability condition for this kind of Keynesian model is (1 – α – δ) > 0, and we will 
assume it holds.  
 
9 The argument we are going to develop holds regardless of the specific value taken by 𝜂. In particular, the following 
results are valid even when 𝜂 = 0.    
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In this model, a higher interest rate reduces both economic activity and its growth rate. By 
construction, this is not due to the impact on investments,  but on households’ income and consumption. 
A lower interest rate increases households’ income because in such a case a lower proportion of non-
financial firms’ gross profits ends up into the pockets of banks, which do not distribute the totality of their 
profits to households. As to λ, the fraction of banks’ distributed profits, its increase stimulates activity and 
growth by raising again households’ income and consumption expenditures. Finally, the higher 
households’ liquidity preference, the lower their income, consumption expenditures, aggregate demand 
and then activity and growth. This is shown in Figure 2 below. This result is in stark contrast with what 
described in Figure 1 under the “Kaldorian view”. The economic rationale of this result is pretty simple. 
Ceteris paribus, a higher liquidity preference of the public implies that a higher share of investment is 
financed by banks’ loans. As a consequence, households will receive lower “direct” capital incomes from 
financial markets and higher banks’ profits in the form of dividends. However, only a share 𝜆 of banks’ 
profits will be distributed as dividends, whilst the remaining will take the form of additional banks’ own 
capital. Given different households’ propensity to consume out of income and wealth, and the reduction 
in overall households’ income, consumptions expenditures declines and so does aggregate demand. The 
AD curve moves leftward from AD1 to AD2 in Figure 2. The economy reaches a new short-run equilibrium 
(point E2 in Figure 2) featuring lower levels of capacity utilization (u2) and capital accumulation (g2) with 
respect to the original equilibrium E1. 
 
Figure 2 – Short-run effects of an increase in liquidity preference in a non-Kaldorian world 
 
Interestingly, our analysis shows that liquidity preference returns to be a key parameter in the 
determination of short-run macro equilibrium (with respect to the Kaldorian view) even in a very simple 
context with endogenous money and a fixed interest rate. Differently from previous contributions, we 
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demonstrate that this holds true even in the absence of capital gains (see Taylor and O’Connell, 1985; 
Lavoie, 2014) or changes in the level of the interest rate or in the spread among different interest rates 
(see Dafermos, 2012; Asensio, 2017). All what we need to get this result is to recognize the very simple 
fact that banks (must) retain some profits to accumulate own funds in order to be allowed to keep on 
conceding loans. Will this result hold in the medium run as well? It is time to say more on banks’ own 
funds accumulation. 
 
5. Liquidity preference and economic activity in the medium run   
Once reaffirmed the importance of liquidity preference for short-run economic activity, it makes sense to 
wondering whether it may also influence medium-run dynamics. Indeed, banks’ ability to operate and 
extend loans is somehow influenced by the solidity of their own balance sheets. In this simple aggregate 
model, this can be captured by banks’ own funds-to-loans ratio Ω = 𝑂𝐹/𝐿, i.e., the equivalent to the 
capital adequacy ratio in the jargon of the Basel agreements. This ratio evolves according to both banks’ 
loans creation (and hence, indirectly, liquidity preference of the public) and profits’ distribution policy. 
Formally, it is convenient to use (5) and (6) and rewrite Ω as follows:   





= 89(1#4)(                                                                                                                       (10) 
 
Given (10), the dynamics of Ω is governed by the percentage variation of banks’ own funds and capital 
accumulation. Taking into account that banks’ own funds are accumulated via retained profits, the 
relevant differential equation for Ω reads: 
   
Ω̇ = Ω D89̇
89
− 𝑔E = Ω D(1#2)%
<
− 𝑔(𝜆)E = 𝜃(Ω, 𝜆)                                                                          (11) 
 
Equation (11) simply states that the evolution of banks’ capital adequacy ratio is a function of 𝜆 as well as 
of the current status of banks’ capital adequacy ratio itself. 
Following Godley and Lavoie (2007), banks adjust their policy of profits’ distribution in order to satisfy 
shareholders’ demand for financial returns but also to avoid excessive discrepancies between the actual 
capital adequacy ratio and the normal one. This is the meaning of equation (12) below, which simply states 
how banks modify through time the share of distributed profits according to the existing gap between Ω 
and Ω∗:  
  
?̇? = 𝜑(Ω − Ω∗) = 𝑓(Ω, 𝜆)											𝜑 > 0	                                                                                         (12) 
 
According to (12), banks will tend to distribute more profits each time the actual own funds-to-loans ratio 
exceeds the target Ω∗ and vice versa. Parameter 𝜑 stands for the speed of adjustment, which may be 
influenced by shareholders’ quest for dividends. 
Equations (11) and (12) form a system of non-linear differential equations through which we can 
describe the dynamics of the system over the medium run and, in particular, the long-lasting effects of 
changes in the liquidity preference of the public. The non-linearity of the system implies that stability can 
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be assessed only in the neighbourhood of the equilibrium. We do this in mathematical appendix 1. In what 
follows, we concentrate on the two isoclines for Ω and 𝜆. 
Put (9) into (11) first, take the steady-state values of Ω and 𝜆 and call them Ω== and 𝜆==. After 
rearranging, one can easily find an explicit solution for 𝜆==: 
𝜆== = 1 −
<##[,(1#/)-5.]
[<##5/(1#4)-(1#/#5)]%
                                                                                                      (13) 
 
By taking the appropriate first derivative, one can easily verify that the isocline Ω̇ = 0 is a downward-




The analysis of the isocline Ω̇ = 0 is much simpler. This is nothing but a vertical line at: 
 
Ω== = Ω∗                                                                                                                                              (14)                                                                                                                                          
 
The economic rationale of this result is fairly intuitive. Outside the equilibrium, whenever the actual own 
funds-to-loans ratio falls below target, banks will reduce 𝜆 and distribute to shareholders a lower share of 
realized profits. They do this in order to “reintegrate” own funds and bring the own funds-to-loans ratio 
closer to target. The opposite happens when Ω > Ω∗.  The two isoclines Ω̇ = 0 and λ̇ = 0 are represented 
in Figure 3, where it is also shown that the economy converges cyclically to its medium-run equilibrium 
(see Mathematical Appendix 1 for a fully-fledged local stability analysis). 
 




10 One can easily verify that #$!!
#%!!
< 0 if (1 − 𝛼 − 𝛿)𝑖 > 0, which we assume to hold true by default as it is the 
standard Keynesian stability condition for a meaningful short-run equilibrium. 
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We are now in a good position to study the medium-run effects of variations in the liquidity preference 
of the public. The formal details of the analysis may be found in Mathematical Appendix 2. In what follows, 
we focus on the economic rationale and the graphical representation of our story (see Figure 4 below). 
Let us consider an increase in liquidity preference (lower 𝜇). From (13) and (14), it is easy to see that 
the isocline λ̇ = 0 is unaffected by this change, whereas the isocline Ω̇ = 0 moves upwards (i.e., 
(𝜕𝜆== 𝜕𝜇⁄ ) < 0) when people decide to “release less cash to firms” (see North-East quadrant in Figure 4). 
The economic mechanism behind this result goes as follows. A higher preference for liquidity induces 
households to purchase less bonds. In our simple model, this forces banks to step in and satisfy firms’ 
financial needs with loans. The amount of new loans conceded by banks, however, declines. This is due 
to the short-run contractionary effects of higher liquidity preference. Indeed, a higher preference for 
liquidity curtails current capacity utilization and induces firms to accumulate less capital. Such a reduction 
in “g” will in turn imply that, ceteris paribus, firms will demand (and receive) less loans than before. From 
the point of view of banks’ balance sheet, this would cause an increase in their actual own funds-to-loans 
ratio. To keep it constant and equal to the target, banks will then distribute more dividends and retain a 
lower share of profits, i.e., 𝜆 increases. 
 





The reduction in 𝜇 and the rise in 𝜆 bear opposite consequences in terms of the evolution of capacity 
utilization and capital accumulation. As said, the increase in liquidity preference tends to reduce “u” (see 
rightward shift of 𝑢 = 𝑓(𝜆, 𝜇) in the North-West quadrant of Figure 4) and, therefore, “g” (South-West 
quadrant of Figure 4). A higher share of distributed profits (out of banks’ total profits), instead, leads to 
higher households’ income, consumptions expenditures, and eventually “u” and “g”. We determine the 
final overall effect of an increase in the preference for liquidity in mathematic appendix 2. The first direct 
contractionary effect of a reduction in 𝜇 over “u” and “g” prevails over the expansionary indirect one (via 
increased 𝜆). In the end, an economic shock that brings about an increase in the liquidity preference of 
the public will cause the economy to stagnate (capacity utilization decreases from u1 to u2 in Figure 4) and 
capital accumulation to slow down (from g1 to g2) not only in the short run, but also in the medium run. 
There are three important theoretical results stemming from our analysis. First, even in a world of 
endogenous money where the banking system behave in a “horizontal” manner and, implicitly, the central 
bank adopts a fully accommodationist stance, liquidity preference of the general public, far from “ceasing 
to be of any importance”, plays a crucial role in shaping the performance of the economy. This holds true 
both in the short and in the medium run.  
Second, we show that we do not need to take into account capital gains/losses and/or assume 
imperfect substitutability between bonds and bank loans (from the borrower’s perspective) to give 
liquidity preference such an important role both in the short and long run. In our model, liquidity 
preference does not play any role in setting interest rates or interest rates’ spreads. Yet, it remains 
important simply because it influences the different channels through which households’ (capital) income 
is generated (i.e., direct remuneration of bonds’ holding or banks’ dividends) and, therefore, households’ 
(consumption) expenditures, aggregate demand, capacity utilization and eventually capital accumulation. 
Third, our model also shows that financial turbulences and sudden increases in liquidity preference 
(i.e., sharp reductions in µ) may cause long-lasting negative effects on economic performances. In other 
words, a financial crash and a sharp flight to liquidity may throw the economy into an enduring depression 
or stagnation.  
 
6. Concluding remarks  
  
In this paper, we contribute to the debate about the role of liquidity preference in the determination of 
economic activity in a world of endogenous money. In particular, we show that liquidity preference does 
not need to influence the determination of the base rate, or the spread among yields from different 
financial assets, or even the occurrence of capital gains or losses in order to be a key determinant of 
capacity utilization and capital accumulation both in the short and in the medium run. In a world where 
banks behave in a “horizontalist” manner, and the central bank adopts a fully accommodationist stance, 
we show that the simple assumption that some positive portion of banks’ profits cannot be distributed is 
more than enough to give back liquidity preference the key role it had in the original Keynesian 
framework. 
Our medium-run analysis seems to suggest that having households eager to invest in financial markets, 
perhaps with a higher propensity to risk and a lower liquidity preference, might be beneficial for capital 
accumulation and economic dynamics. Could we take this result as an indication of the potential virtues 
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of “money managers” or “financial” capitalism (Wray, 2011)? Are households’ active participation to 
financial markets, as intermediated by buoyant institutional investors (Whalen, 2017), and the rising share 
of capital income over national income (Power et al., 2003; Piketty, 2014) good news for the whole 
economy? The answer is no, at least for two good reasons.  
First, in this paper, we do not make any comparison between different types of capitalism, say 
paternalistic or industrial capitalism (Minsky, 1986; Hudson, 2010) of the “golden age” on the one side, 
and the current financial capitalism on the other. What we claim is that in a financialized system where 
financial markets gain increasing relevance in affecting the behaviour of the economy, it is vital to ensure 
that financial markets keep on working smoothly, and that they are not hit by major waves of panic and 
sudden runs to liquidity. This is even the more so if banks’ disintermediation and increasing importance 
of market-based financial systems (i.e., a stronger participation of the public to financial markets via the 
intermediation of money managers) may have increased exposure to financial shocks11. In a way, our 
paper formalises the original Minsky’s idea that “the channels by which Federal Reserve [central banks, 
more generally] operations affect the economy may no longer be by changing the availability or cost of 
financing, but rather by affecting uncertainty: by affecting the evaluation by portfolio managers of the 
viability of enterprises and the stability of markets” (Minsky, 1994, p.1). In the present state of capitalism, 
saving Wall Street from financial shocks is fundamental to avoid Main Street to collapse. We could well 
interpret this result as an additional sign of financial markets’ “take-over” of the real economy (Storm, 
2018).  
Second, our model provides a simplified representation of reality that, for the sake of analytical 
tractability, does not take on board several aspects of modern financialized economies. In this paper, for 
instance, we do not endogenize the heightened instability and vulnerability of the current type of 
capitalism to financial crises, with the ensuing consequences in terms of (non-financial) firms’ animal 
spirits and willingness to invest. More than that, in the present paper we do not pay attention to 
distributional issues. Indeed, here we do not model the increasing level of income inequality and wealth 
concentration that has accompanied the development of modern financialized economies (Botta et al., 
2019), as well as the increasing debt burden on the shoulders of low- and middle-income households. It 
goes without saying that these aspects could well contribute to provide a far less enthusiastic image of 
the alleged virtuous of a financialized economy. 
All these issues are potentially interesting extensions of our model and could make it richer and more 
nuancé. None of them, however, would alter the central theoretical message we want to reiterate once 
again. The original insight of Maynard Keynes is to be rescued:  liquidity preference and financial markets 
matter, and money endogeneity, not even in its radical, horizontalist declination, does not mean that we 





11 Indeed, this is a crucial tenet of Minskyan analysis stressing how money manager capitalism may be affected by 
heightened financial instability (see Wray, 2009; Whalen, 2012). This view is also consistent with Adrien and Shin 
(2009), when they note that in the immediate aftermath of the 2007-2008 financial shock, larger commercial banks’ 




Adrian T., and H.S. Shin. 2009. “Money, Liquidity, and Monetary Policy”, American Economic Review: 
Papers and Proceedings, vol.99 (2), 600 – 605.  
Asensio, A. 2017. “Insights on endogenous money and the liquidity preference theory of interest”, Journal 
of Post-Keynesian Economics, vol.40 (3), 327 – 348. 
Bertocco G., and A. Kalajzic. 2014. “The liquidity preference theory: A critical analysis”, University of 
Insubria department of economics working paper no.1402. 
Bertocco, G., and A. Kalajzic. 2018. “The zero lower bound and the asymmetric efficacy of monetary policy: 
A view from the history of economic ideas”, Italian Economic Journal, vol.4 (3), 549 – 566.  
Bibow, J. 2009. “Keynes on Monetary Policy, Finance and Uncertainty: Liquidity Preference Theory and 
the Global Financial Crisis”, London: Routhledge. 
Botta, A., Caverzasi, E., Russo, A., Gallegati, M., and J.E. Stiglitz. 2021. “Inequality and finance in a rent 
economy”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol.183 (March), 998 – 1029. 
Carlin, W., and D. Soskice. 2014. “Macroeconomics: Institutions, Instability and the Financial System”, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Dafemos, Y. 2012. “Liquidity preference, uncertainty, and recession in a stock-flow consistent model”, 
Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics, vol.34 (4), 749 – 776. 
Davidson, P. 1972, “Money and the Real World”, London: Macmillan 
Dow, S. C. 1997. “Endogenous Money”. In: G. C. Harcourt G.C., and P.A. Riach (ed.) “A ‘Second Edition’ of 
The General Theory”, 43 – 55. London and New York: Routledge. 
Federal Reserve of New York. 2018. “Quarterly trends for consolidated U.S. banking organizations – first 
quarter 2018”. 
Fontana, G. and M. Setterfield. 2009. “A simple (and teachable) macroeconomic model with endogenous 
money”. In:  Fontana, G. and M. Setterfield. (eds.). “Macroeconomic Theory and Macroeconomic 
Pedagogy”, 144 – 168, London: Palgrave Macmillan.   
Hudson, M. 2010. “The Transition from Industrial Capitalism to a Financialized Bubble Economy”, Levy 
Economics Institute of Bard College Working Paper no.627.   
Kaldor N. 1985. “How monetarism failed”, Challange, vol.28 (2), 4 – 13. 
Kalecki, M. (1937), “The Principle of increasing risk”, Economica, vol.4 (76), 441 - 447 
Keynes, J.M., 1937, “The ‘Ex-Ante’ Theory of the Rate of Interest”, The Economic Journal, vol.47 (188), 663 
- 669 
Lavoie, M. 2006. “Endogenous money: Accommodationist”. In: Arestis, P., and M. Sawyer (eds). 
“Handbook of Alternative Monetary Economics”, 17 – 34, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
Lavoie, M. 1996. “Horizontalism, Struturalism, liquidity preference and the principle of increasing risk”, 
Scottish Journal of Political Economy, vol.43 (3), 275 – 300. 
Lavoie, M. 2009. “Taming the new consensus: Hysteresis and some other Post-Keynesian amendments”. 
In: Fontana, G., and M. Setterfield (eds.). “Macroeconomic Theory and Macroeconomic Pedagogy”, 191 
– 213, London: Palgrace Macmillan. 
Lavoie, M. 2014. “Post-Keynesian economics: New foundations”, Cheltenham (UK) and Northampton, MA 
(USA): Edward Elgar.  
 20 
Lavoie, M. and S., Reissl. 2019. “Further insights on endogenous money and the liquidity preference 
theory of interest”, Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics, vol.42 (4), 503 – 526. 
Le Heron, E. and T. Mouakil. 2008. “A post-Keynesian stock-flow consistent model for the dynamic analysis 
of monetary policy shock on banking behaviour”, Metroeconomica, vol.59 (3), 405 – 440. 
Mehrling, P. 2020. “Payment vs. funding: The law of reflux for today” Institute of New Economic Thinking 
working paper series no.113, freely downloadable from INET website: 
https://www.ineteconomics.org/uploads/papers/WP_113-Mehrling-Payment-vs-Funding.pdf. 
Minsky, P.H. 1986. “Stabilizing and Unstable Economy”, Yale University Press. 
Minsky, P.H. 1994. “Financial instability and the decline(?) of banking: Public policy implications”, Levy 
Economics Institute Working Paper no.127.  
Moore, B.1988. “The Endogenous Money Supply”, Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, vol.10 (3), 372 – 
385.   
Oreiro J.L., Fernando de Paula, L., and J.P. Heringer Machado. 2020. “Liquidity preference, capital 
accumulation and investment financing: Fernando Carvalho’s contributions to the post-Keynesian 
paradigm”, Review of Political Economy, vol. 32 (1), 121 - 139.  
Palley, T. 1994. "Competing views of the money supply: Theory and tvidence", Metroeconomica, vol.45 
(1), 67 – 88. 
Palley, T. 2013. “Horizontalists, verticalists, and structuralists: the theory of endogenous money 
reassessed”, Review of Keynesian Economics, vol.1 (4), 406 – 424.   
Palley, T. 2017. “The theory of endogenous money and the LM schedule: prelude to a reconstruction of 
IS-LM”, Revista de Economia Politica, vol.37 (1), 3 – 22. 
Piketty, T. 2014. “Capital in the Twenty-First Century”, Cambridge (MA) and London (UK): Harvard 
University Press. 
Power, D., Epstein, G., and M. Abrena. 2003. “Trends in The Rentier Income Share in OECD Countries, 1960 
– 200”, PERI Working Paper no.58a. 
Storm, S. 2018. “Financial Markets Have Taken over the Economy. To Prevent Another Crisis, They Must 
Be Brought to Heel”, freely downloadable from the Institute of New Economic Thinking (INET) website:  
https://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectives/blog/financial-markets-have-taken-over-the-economy-
to-stop-the-next-crisis-they-must-be-brought-to-heel. 
Taylor, L. 2004. “Reconstructing Macroeconomics”, Cambridge, MA (USA), and London (UK): Harvard 
University Press. 
Taylor, L., and S. O’Connell. 1985. “A Minsky crisis”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.100 
(supplement), 871 – 885. 
Taylor, L., and C. Rada. 2008. “Debt-equity cycles in the twentieth century: Empirical evidence and a 
dynamic Keynesian model” In: Flaschel P., and M. Landesmann (eds.). “Mathematical Economics and 
the Dynamics of Capitalism”, London: Routledge. 
Whalen, J.C. 2012. “Money Manager Capitalism”, In: Toporoski J., and J. Michell (eds.). “Handbook of 
Critical Issues in Finance”, Cheltenham (UK) and Northampton, MA (USA): Edward Elgar. 
Whalen, J.C. 2017. “Understanding Financialization: Standing on the Shoulders of Minsky”, Levy Economics 
Institute of Bard College Working Paper no.892. 
Wray, R. 2009. “The Rise and Fall of Money Manager Capitalism: A Minskyan Approach”, Cambridge 




In order to analyse the local stability of our system of differential equations, let first define the Jacobian 
matrix (J) of partial derivates in the neighbourhood of the steady state. We do this in the mathematical 
expressions (A.1) and (A.2) reported below.  
 

































                                                                          (A.2) 
 
Consistent with Figure 3 in the main text, the definition of the Jacobian matrix (J) in expression (A.2) 
confirms that the locus for (Ω̇ = 0) is a downward-sloping function of Ω, whilst the locus for (λ̇ = 0) is 
straight vertical line. More than that, given (A.2), we compute the determinant det.(J) and the trace Tr.(J) 
of the Jacobian matrix (J) in equations (A.3) and (A.4) below:  
  
𝑑𝑒𝑡. (𝐽) = 𝑖 _1 + 5/(1#F)<##
(1#/#5)
` > 0                                                                                        (A.3) 
 
𝑇𝑟. (𝐽) = − (1#2##)%
<##
< 0                                                                                                       (A.4) 
 
It is easy to see that the determinant is positive, whilst the trace is negative. The medium-run equilibrium 
of our economy is locally stable. Outside the equilibrium (but close to it), the economy will cyclically 




In order to define the medium-run effects of a rise in liquidity preferences, we need to take the medium-
run equilibrium value of capacity utilization (i.e., the level of capacity utilization in the steady state) and 







𝑑𝜇                                                                                                    (A.5) 
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In order to verify whether a rise in liquidity preference will expand or curtail capacity utilization in the 
medium run, we need to determine the parametric conditions under which equation (A.6) is positive. 










   
 
Once plugged in the above expression the value for (1 − 𝜆KK) from equation (13), we have: 
 
(1 − 𝜇) <##
%[,(1#/)-5.]5/%
{[<##5/(1#4)-(1#/#5)]%}%
< <##[,(1#/)-5.][<##5/(1#4)-(1#/#5)]%                                                           (A.7) 
 
After some simple algebraic adjustments, one can rewrite condition (A.7) as follows: 
 
(1 − 𝜇) <##5/[<##5/(1#4)-(1#/#5)] < 1.                                                                                                  (A.8) 
 
Once multiplied both sides of (A.8) by [Ω==𝛿𝛼(1 − 𝜇) + (1 − 𝛼 − 𝛿)], it is easy to verify that it always 
holds true since that (1 − 𝛼 − 𝛿) > 0. As we know, a rise in liquidity preference (i.e., a lower value of 𝜇) 
will depress economic activity (u) and, therefore, capital accumulation (see equation (3)) in the short run. 
Such contractionary effects of a higher preference for liquidity will persist in the medium run also.    
 
 
